Do Chimeras Have Minds?

Suppose that a colleague proposed a fantastic experiment: to introduce human stem cells into a neonatal mouse so that its entire brain developed into human-like neuronal structures. The colleague claimed it would still be a mouse, and that its chimeric brain would be nothing like a human one. It would not, as a result, have a moral status beyond its nonhuman animal origins. Thus, the human neuron mouse would allow scientists to tinker with human-like neurology in ways that would be precluded if it were a human being, and that would promise to lead to substantial understanding of the destructive and incurable brain diseases that befall humanity. The colleague does admit, however, that for reasons of comparative fidelity, experiments in human patients would be scientifically preferable, although in this case, neither ethically justified nor legally permitted. For that reason, it might be desirable to create a human brain in a nonhuman primate, where it would be more likely that significant human-like neuronal development would occur, but still could not become a person. This article explores the significance of a human neuron chimpanzee, and suggests that contradictions in the design of the experiment make it unethical to proceed in either murine or primate models.