Corporate governance and ultimate control

Narjess Boubakri; Omrane Guedhami; Oumar Sy

doi:10.1016/S1569-3767(08)09015-8

Corporate governance and ultimate control

Narjess Boubakri, Omrane Guedhami, Oumar Sy

Rowe School of Business

Management

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

This chapter investigates the role of macro corporate governance (legal and extra legal institutions) in determining the extent of ultimate excess control (i.e., the ownership-controls rights divergence of the ultimate owner) using a large sample of Asian and European companies. We find that the level of excess control is lower in countries with (1) good investor protection and better enforcement of information disclosure and (2) fairer competition laws, higher newspaper diffusion, and more regulated insider trading. Controlling for institutions subsumes the effect of firm-level determinants, as only leverage appears to be negatively and significantly related to excess control.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Institutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance
Subtitle of host publication	Business Systems and Beyond
Editors	Jay Choi, Sandra Dow
Pages	385-413
Number of pages	29
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3767(08)09015-8
Publication status	Published - 2008

Publication series

Name	International Finance Review
Volume	9
ISSN (Print)	1569-3767

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank Jean-Claude Cosset, Art Durnev, Mara Faccio, Sadok El Ghoul, Larry Lang, Sorin Rizeanu, and Que Giang Tran Thi for insightful comments. They are also grateful to Larry Lang for providing them with the data on European and Asian corporations. The usual disclaimer applies. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

Finance

Access to Document

10.1016/S1569-3767(08)09015-8

Cite this

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Corporate governance and ultimate control

Abstract

Publication series

Bibliographical note

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

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