Resumen
This chapter investigates the role of macro corporate governance (legal and extra legal institutions) in determining the extent of ultimate excess control (i.e., the ownership-controls rights divergence of the ultimate owner) using a large sample of Asian and European companies. We find that the level of excess control is lower in countries with (1) good investor protection and better enforcement of information disclosure and (2) fairer competition laws, higher newspaper diffusion, and more regulated insider trading. Controlling for institutions subsumes the effect of firm-level determinants, as only leverage appears to be negatively and significantly related to excess control.
| Idioma original | English |
|---|---|
| Título de la publicación alojada | Institutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance |
| Subtítulo de la publicación alojada | Business Systems and Beyond |
| Editores | Jay Choi, Sandra Dow |
| Páginas | 385-413 |
| Número de páginas | 29 |
| DOI | |
| Estado | Published - 2008 |
Serie de la publicación
| Nombre | International Finance Review |
|---|---|
| Volumen | 9 |
| ISSN (versión impresa) | 1569-3767 |
Nota bibliográfica
Funding Information:The authors would like to thank Jean-Claude Cosset, Art Durnev, Mara Faccio, Sadok El Ghoul, Larry Lang, Sorin Rizeanu, and Que Giang Tran Thi for insightful comments. They are also grateful to Larry Lang for providing them with the data on European and Asian corporations. The usual disclaimer applies. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Finance